Saturday, November 19, 2005
Center of Excellence Proposal
à
Barry said:
<quote>
I am not sure about 'affinity' and 'path of
least resistance'. Do you
have definitions for these terms. It is not
clear to me that
'intention' is a term that should belong to
a top-level ontology;
does it not belong rather to the level of
psychology? In any case an
intention would be an instance of the type:
dependent continuant, in BFO terms.
As to affordances, environment, and the
like (entities dear to my
heart as a stout Aristotelo-Gibsonian) see:
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/medo/Functions_Smith.html
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/bio/niche-smith.htm
<end quote>
Thank you
Barry for the responses. I am trying to
provide a type of history of discussions....
for those who might wish to look into the question of "what is occurring
with "ontologies"".
http://www.ontologystream.com/beads/nationalDebate/211.htm
I also
post in my own "web log" because I find the interspersing of text
hard to follow in eforums.
Regarding
Gibson's use of the word "affordance"..
http://www.ontologystream.com/beads/nationalDebate/211.htm#_(Note_from_Paul
(Note
from Paul Prueitt:
ah, I
would have only used the term “affordance” as Gibson used it. It is noteworthy to note that Karl Pribram
and I have discussed Gibson’s notion of affordance and Karl has been very
insistent that Gibson refused to find the notion of internal affordance from the
living system that is intention. He feels
that this distinction between how Pribram sees internal and external
affordances as being quite different in many respects. “Affinity” (for specific action) and “path
of least resistant” (as in Newtonian systems) would not be “technical terms by
my use of language in a common way to get at the meaning I attribute to
“affordance” (as used by myself, as a type of “merge” of the use by Gibson and
Pribram.)
<end
Note>
Tom Adi
and John Sowa and I would all, i feel, appreciate the subsumption of the term "intentionality"
within the cell : dependent
continuant... where this cell is formed
as a cross product of a set of elementary "primes". The subsumption would, however, be
"loose". Developing a crisp
ontology about intention is part of what is required if the OASIS notion of
"intention"
Important
aspects in the (Nov 15th) OASIS draft,
{
visibility, interaction, effect }
lead to
framework elements
{
capability, service, service description }
and
{
exchange, execution context, policy }
require
an ontology of "intention".
What is the intention behind the request for service? The presence of the framework cell
"dependant continuant" should allow one to instrument (create a
program to provide interoperability) for the fulfillment of a web service request
given the need to resolve ambiguity created by ontology category and response
degeneracy in the use of words.
Do you
approach the development of ontological elements using a framework of this
type? This "generalFramework
theory" is "all" that I am advocating with this theory on
stratified ontology, i.e. that an ontology of atomic elements that compose to
any "thing" can be found (at least within the context of a field of
study - like chemistry).
Goggle
"stratified ontology"
http://www.hfr.org.uk/ternality-papers/whatgained-ab.htm
(D. K. Steward's work)
and
others.... but somehow the concept is
generally treated in a confused way.
again my
position is at
http://www.ontologystream.com/aSLIP/files/stratification.htm
Adi, Sowa
and perhaps a few other (Ballard, some in the former Soviet Union) have
developed sets of primes that are possible universal event atoms... but somehow
the problem of universal semantic primes remains open. (right?)
***
you said
"Our
job, surely, is to move beyond the domain of what can be loosely held."
and I do
not find this correct, as I feel that (and John expressed something about this
a little bit ago) Wittgenstein in his later years was right regarding
"language as being a game of using words to point at reality"
By
loosely held I would mean a semiotics system that allows people to point at
semantics.
Is this
similar to how you feel?