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Friday, January 27, 2006

 

 The BCNGroup Beadgames

 

 

Challenge Problem à

 

[148] ß [parallel discussion on generative methodology (Judith Rosen)

[147] ß [parallel discussion on generative methodology (Peter Krieg)

[368] ß [comment on four issues (Richard Ballard)

[150]  ß [Deeper discussion between Judith Rosen and Peter Krieg on relationalism

 

 

 

 

Four Issues about Ontological Modeling

 

[374] ß [A return to the issue of ontological modeling

Communication from Paul Werbos  à [367]

 

 

 

 

I want to return to Paul Werbos's position, that

 

"I do believe that the physical universe as a whole can be plausibly represented via formal mathematical models, to the best of our knowledge today, and that we are well advised to push such understanding further than we have yet."

 

This is the critical issue.  Rosen took a different position, and Paul Werbos, Peter Kugler and I have talked about this difference for over a decade.

 

Clearly, Paul Werbos's statement has merit.  But there is also a slight misrepresentation of what the alternative viewpoint would want to be exposed.

 

No one is really questioning that we as a human race should push "understanding" further than we have yet.

 

The counter claim is that Hilbert mathematics formalizes in such a way that human induction/abduction produces a limitation that Godel and Penrose have talked about.  So, one has to figure out how to address this limitation.

 

Rosen's work, and other's work, suffered because of institionalized bias (as is testified by his daughter Judith) - otherwise we (the human race) might have been much further along in "understanding further that we have yet".

 

This institutional bias was responsible for Rosen and Rashensky having to abandon a newly created "Department of Theoretical Biology" at Univ of Chicago in 1963.  I think I have the dates and name correct.  Maybe Judith will correct me.

 

Peter Kugler does not like to talk about it, but developed important work in a series of (never funded) NSF proposals (there were I think 6 or 7 of these - one each year.  )  The non-funding of this work is nothing but the same institutional bias. 

 

It would not be hard to come up with many examples of specific bias, that does not take into account the well accepted limitations of Hilbert formalism.

 

These non-funded proposals, and these works, were addressing in a new way the limitation of Hilbert mathematics... and could have potentially extended "our understanding" further in a way that has not to this date been extended.